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Labor Law-Pre-emption and State Injunctive Enforcement of the
"Right-to-Work" Law
When may a state court validly enjoin picketing that is peaceful in
its conduct but is intended to accomplish an unlawful purpose? This
is a question that has caused considerable confusion since the TaftHartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1947,1 which
specify that certain activity on the part of labor unions constitutes an
unfair labor practice. A state court judge who has a petition for an
injunction against picketing usually will have two difficult questions
to answer. First, assuming that the picketing is for an unlawful purpose, is it protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution as a valid exercise of free speech ?2 Secondly, assuming that the
picketing sought to be enjoined is not protected by the free-speech
doctrine, is it conduct which amounts to an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA, thus leaving the state court without jurisdiction ?3
The North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the second
question of federal pre-emption in the recent case of Douglas Aircraft
4
Co. v. Local 379, InternationalBrotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL.
The plaintiff was engaged in the production of guided missiles under
a contract with the United States. The Company's plant was surrounded by a chain link fence. The plaintiff company maintained control
of all entrances and exits to the tract because of its responsibility for
safeguarding secret information concerning its contracts. On the same
tract were buildings occupied by other contractors performing work for
the government. A construction firm had a contract with the Army for
the erection of buildings on the same tract. Defendant union established
picket lines at all the entrances to the tract of land occupied by the
plaintiff and its subcontractors. The plaintiff alleged that no labor
dispute existed between the construction company and its employees or
the plaintiff and its employees; that the picketing was the result of a
conspiracy intended to compel the plaintiff to deny admittance to the
grounds to non-union employees of the construction company, thereby
requiring the construction company to confine its employment to members of defendant union in violation of the North Carolina "Right-to'49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1952) (hereinafter

referred to as the NLRA).
See Local 695, Teamsters Union, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957), where
Justice Frankfurter summarizes the leading cases involving picketing and freedom
of expression. See also Forkosch, Picketing in Labor Relations, 26 FORDHAm
L. REv. 391 (1957).
' See Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versi" State .turisdiction, 42
A.B.A.J. 415 (1956), for a discussion of pre-emption problems arising from the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act; Note, 35 N.C.L.
REv. 329 (1957).
'247 N.C. 620, 101 S.E.2d 800 (1958).
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Work" law ;5 that many of plaintiff's employees had refused to cross the
picket line established by the defendant union, thus hampering the plaintiff in the performance of its contracts.
On the evidence and stipulation of the parties that plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the NLRA and
that the picketing was peaceful, a temporary restraining order was continued until final hearing. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the ground that under the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec.
Workers, AFL v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 6 the NLRA places
exclusive primary jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board 7
in such a case and deprives the superior court of authority to issue the
restraining order. In view of its decision in J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v.
Local 755, InternationalBrotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL8 and the
general tenor of its opinion in the Douglas Aircraft case, it would seem
likely that the North Carolina Supreme Court would have upheld the
restraining order if there had been no controlling decision of the United
States Supreme Court in point. After discussing the general case law
development of the federal-state jurisdictional question, the court concluded its opinion by pointing to the case of Farnsworth & Chambers
Co. v'. Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL.9
Here the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld an injunction against picketing which it found to be for the purpose of compelling a violation of
the Tennessee "Right-to-Work" law. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Tennessee court in a per curiam opinion. 10 The North
Carolina Supreme Court said it could find no distinction in the facts
between the Farnsworth case and the case before it," and that "the
Court having final authority to ascertain congressional intent has de2s
clared the law. '
The Farnsworthcase further clarified the "penumbral area" in jurisdiction of labor disputes which the United States Supreme Court has
said "can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of litiga'N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1950).
0353 U.S. 969 (1957).

'Hereinafter
to as852
the (1957).
NLRB.
8246 N.C. 481,referred
98 S.E.2d
'299 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1957).

"0Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL v. Farnsworth

& Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957). Despite express congressional authorization to the states to enact "Right-to-Work" laws (see note 14 infra), the Court

indicates that the states may be prohibited from exercising injunctive relief when
violations of such laws are also subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
" The only distinction that could be made in respect to the parties in the two
cases is that in Farnsworth the picketing was directed at the plaintiff, while in
the Douglas Aircraft case the picketing was primarily directed at a party other
than the plaintiff although the plaintiff was adversely affected by the picketing.
2247 N.C. at 630, 101 S.E.2d at 808.
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tion.''1 3 How far has the Farnsworth case gone in determining the
effect of the pre-emption doctrine on state legislation forbidding or
restricting union-security agreements pursuant to section 14(b) of the
NLRA ?14 It is submitted that the case has answered the federal-state
jurisdictional question in the usual situation where a state court might
attempt to enjoin picketing on the basis of a state "Right-to-Work" law
but has not rendered the "penumbral area" completely clear.
The per curiam opinion in the Farnsworth case cited Garner v.
Local 776, Teamsters Union, AFL 5 and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc.,16 which are the leading cases on federal pre-emption under the
NLRA. In Garner, the Court held that if the alleged conduct of a
party to a labor dispute was such that it would constitute an unfair labor
practice subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the state court was
without jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct, even though the conduct also
violated a state statute or judicial policy governing labor-management
relations. The Weber case further clarified the jurisdictional question
by holding that the rule of the Garner case would apply even if the
alleged wrongful conduct violated state law or policy in a field other
than labor relations.' 7 As pointed out by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the Douglas Aircraft case, "Neither the Garner nor the Weber
case dealt specifically with an act declared by Congress to be an unfair
labor practice, and by a State law authorized by Congress, also defined
as unlawful."'I s
The question presented in the Farnsworthcase was whether section
14(b), in effect, ceded to state courts jurisdiction to enjoin the union's
peaceful picketing on an interstate employer's complaint that state
"Right-to-Work" laws are being violated even though such picketing constitutes either protected activity under sections 7 and 13, or an unfair
labor practice under section 8 of the NLRA.' 9 The Court, by answering
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955).
14 "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
' 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
16348 U.S. 468 (1955).
17 Even if the unlawful conduct is such as to subject it to the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, the state may still act under its police power to prevent violence or
mass picketing, Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942), and it may act through an administrative body regulating labor-management relations, United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956). However, any
injunction must be aimed at the violence or mass picketing complained of and to
the extent that an injunction prohibits all other picketing it enters the pre-empted
domain of the NLRB. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
18247 N.C. at 630, 101 S.E.2d at 808.
19 See 25 U.S.L. WFxzl 3309 (U.S. April 23, 1957) (No. 891).
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this question in the negative, merely indicated that where conduct violates
a provision of the NLRA the state court is without jurisdiction even
though a state labor policy is involved. This result seems completely in
harmony with and goes no further than the results in the Garner and
Weber cases. The decision did not in itself hold that picketing in violation or attempted violation of a "Right-to-Work" law would necessarily
constitute an unfair labor practice.20

Prior to the decision in the Farn-worth case, the decisions of the
various state courts were in conflict as to whether a state court could
enjoin picketing which it determined to be in violation of a state's
"Right-to-Work" law.2 ' In many of the cases upholding the authority
of the state courts, the question of interstate commerce was not raised
or the parties were obviously not engaged in interstate commerce and
therefore no question of pre-emption was present. 22 Typically in these
0 For examples of areas where the state may exercise jurisdiction even if the
employer is in interstate commerce, see Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1948). The Court held that since
Wisconsin could deny the use of the union shop under the NLRA, it could impose
a less severe restriction such as requiring a two-thirds vote of the employees to
validate a maintenance of membership agreement. Wisconsin thus had jurisdiction
in a damage suit for discharge in violation of the state law regulating unionsecurity agreements. See also Local 232, Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), where the Court held that intermittent work stoppages and slowdowns were conduct neither prohibited nor
protected by the NLRA and subject to the jurisdiction of a state labor board.
2" State court held to have jurisdiction, International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL
v. Goff-McNair Motor Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954) (injunction against
peaceful picketing to obtain a closed shop agreement); Mascari v. Local 667,
Teamsters Union, AFL, 187 Tenn. 345, 215 S.W.2d 779 (1948) (injunction against
recognized union on strike to secure a union-security clause as part of a collective
bargaining agreement). Exclusive jurisdiction held to be in NLRB, Leiter Mfg.
Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL, 269 S.W.2d 409
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (injunction against discharge of employees because of union
membership) ; Texas Constr. Co. v. Local 101, Hoisting and Portable Engineers
Union, AFL, 178 Kan. 422, 286 P.2d 160 (1955) (injunction against picketing by
stranger union t6 compel employer to recognize union).
" In Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, AFL v. Graham, 345
U.S. 192 (1953), a labor union picketed a general contractor for the purpose (as
found by the Virginia court) of inducing the contractor to break contracts with
any of his subcontractors who did not employ all union labor. The Court did not
discuss the question of jurisdiction. The Court upheld an injunction issued by the
Virginia court on the ground that there was no undue restraint of freedom of
speech when the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. The dissenting justice
would have remanded the case for a specific finding of fact, stating, "The difficulty
here is that we have no finding of fact. We have only the recitation in the decree
that the picketing conflicted with the Virginia statute." Id. at 202-03. Apparently
the dissenter felt that if the Court was to allow the state to enjoin picketing in
violation of the Virginia statute, the decree should be limited to that purpose and
should not restrain picketing indiscriminately. See Schlossberg, Current Trends
in Labor Law it Virginia, 42 VA. L. Rv.691, 696 (1956), where the author,
in discussing the Graham case, said, "While the work in question seems to have
been of such a nature as to have had an effect on interstate commerce, it is
significant that counsel for the union did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, nor
did counsel for the NLRB take part in the appeal." Since this case was decided
before the Garner case, it is doubtful if the same result would be reached if it
arose again.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

cases, the picketing was instigated by non-employees and the facts found
indicated that the majority of the employees of the picketed employer
were either opposed to any unionization in general or to unionization by
the union causing the picketing. The findings of fact led to the reasonable implication that often the primary purpose of the picketing was not
to "educate" the employees but to compel the employer to recognize
the union with or without the consent. of his employees. In similar
cases, where the parties would have been affecting interstate commerce
so as to be under the jurisdiction of the NLRB if an unfair labor practice
were committed, state courts have often determined they had power
to enjoin the picketing. The courts seemed to reach their conclusion
by overlooking the immediate purpose of the picketing. Thus the
courts would look to the ultimate purpose of securing a union shop or
similar union-security agreement, which is not necessarily violative of
the NLRA, and would not sufficiently consider the immediate purpose
of the picketing to compel an employer to recognize the union and
coerce his employees into membership against their wishes, which under
section 8(b) (2)23 constitutes an unfair labor practice subject to the
24
jurisdiction of the NLRB.
North Carolina would seem to be among those states which prior
to the Farnsworthcase would have determined that the state court had
jurisdiction to enjoin picketing in a situation similar to that presented
2"National

Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (2), 61

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1952).

STAT.

141 (1947), as amended,

24 While the Farn,sworth case indicates the Court is continuing to limit the
scope of state jurisdiction in the pre-emption field, the Court at the same time is
apparently giving the states greater freedom in regulating picketing where the
conduct does not affect interstate commerce so as to be subject to the jurisdiction
of the NLRB. Since Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), which held *a
state ban on picketing invalid as denying the right of free dissemination of information guaranteed under the Constitution, and AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941), where the Court said that organizational picketing per se could not be
enjoined, the Court has narrowed the scope of protected picketing activity by expanding the unlawful purpose doctrine of Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949). In Local 695, Teamsters Union, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284
(1957), the Court upheld a state injunction against picketing that was conducted
by one or two pickets with no evidence of violence or intimidation, stating, "[T]he
circumstances set forth in the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court afford
a rational basis for the inference it drew concerning the purpose of the picketing."
Id. at 295. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the Vogt case was another
in a series of cases where "the state court's characterization of the picketers' 'purpose' had been made well-nigh conclusive." Id. at 296. See Stern, Enioinable
OrganizationalPicketinq, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 12 (1957), where the author refers to
the Vogt case as providing a constitutionally protected "non-right" to stranger
picket for organizational purposes. See also Smoot, StrangerPicketing: Permanent
Injunction or Permanent Litigation, 42 A.B.A.J. 817 (1956). Some of the possible
ramifications of the Voot case are indicated by Daugherty v. Commonwealth,
100 S.E.2d 754 (Va. 1957), where the Virginia Supreme Court approved a statute
that prohibited all picketing by non-employees. The court further said there was
no question of pre-emption because the NLRA is limited to disputes between
employees and their employers.
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in the Douglas Aircraft case. In J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Local 755,
InternationalBrotherhoodof Elec. Workers, AFL25 the factual situation
was similar to that in the Douglas Aircraft case. The plaintiff construction company alleged that the purpose of the picketing was to
coerce the plaintiff into compelling his subcontractors to hire only union
labor. The defendant union demurred to the jurisdiction of the court on
the basis that the conduct complained of would, if true, constitute an
unfair labor practice over which the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction
and filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint. The
demurrer was overruled and the restraining order continued, from which
the union appealed. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
order of the trial court without determining the question of jurisdiction.
The court said that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter was made as a demurrer and that in such a plea, the lack
of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint and may not be
raised by extrinsic facts. Since the complaint did not indicate whether
or not the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce, the alleged lack
of jurisdiction did not appear on the face of the complaint. The trial
judge, after continuing the restraining order, found the facts on which
the order was based at the request of the defendant. One of the
facts found, which plaintiff admitted, was that the dollar volume of
out-of-state purchases made by the plaintiff was in excess of the mini26
mum volume required by the NLRB before it will exercise jurisdiction.
While deciding the Jones Construction case on the pleadings point,
it would seem doubtful in the light of the conceded volume of plaintiff's
interstate business found by the trial judge whether the court would have
allowed the injunction to stand on the pleadings point unless it thought
there was a reasonable basis to sustain jurisdiction of the state court,
even if the facts alleged in the complaint showed the plaintiff to be in
interstate commerce. 27 In the Douglas Aircraft case there were no
25246 N.C. 48, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
" See 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 2-5 (1955).

The NLRB will decline jurisdiction

unless the business of the employer involved affects interstate commerce in an

amount equal to or greater than specified minimum amounts. An employer who
does not meet the minimum requirements of the NLRB may still be subject to its
jurisdiction even though it declines to exercise it. The no man's land created by
the Guss case (see note 50 infra) would not be involved in the Jones Construction
case since the facts admitted by the employer show his business to be of such a
volume as to meet the NLRB's jurisdictional requirements.
-"The court in overruling the demurrer referred to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127
(1953), which provides: "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it
appears upon the face thereof . . . that: (1) The court has no jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant, or of the subject of the action . .. ." The court then
discussed Southerland v. Harrell, 204 N.C. 675, 169 S.E. 423 (1933), where a
demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter in a wrongful
death action was overruled on the ground that the complaint on its face did not
indicate the defendants regularly employed more than five employees so as to give
the Industrial Commission jurisdiction. This rule, while a proper procedural device

508
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allegations that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce, 28 and
the trial court treated the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a
demurrer. It is difficult to distinguish the cases on any basis other than
that the court in the Douglas Aircraft case had the Farnsworth case
before it.2
How far then is the state's jurisdiction over injunctive enforcement
of "Right-to-Work" legislation limited by the Farnsworth case? As
a possible indication that it was not wholly in sympathy with what it determined to be the United States Supreme Court's expression of congressional intent in Farnsworth,the court in the Douglas Aircraft case
said, "Congress has... said the states might... outlaw union or closed
shop agreements . . . ,"0 and questioned whether Congress intended "to
deny to a state a power to enforce a law which it permitted that state
to enact?"31 In answer to its own question as to congressional intent
in enacting section 14(b) of the NLRA, the court said the NLRB "has
no authority to enforce the laws of North Carolina even though the laws
It seems patent
are enacted pursuant to congressional authority ....
to us that Congress did not intend to authorize a state to enact a2
8
statute and at the same moment prohibit it from enforcing the statute."
in. the ordinary civil action, seems rather a harsh one where the court is giving
equitable relief in the stringent form of an injunction granted well before final
hearing on the merits. The Southerland case was a wrongful death action and no
preliminary relief affecting the interests and rights of the parties was being
granted. The application of such a rule to the granting of a temporary injunction
as in the Jones Comtruction case, where the court had the relevant and conceded
jurisdictional facts before it, affects substantial interests of the parties. It is
questionable in the light of the Douglas Aircraft case whether the court would have
applied a technical procedural rule to the granting of an equitable remedy unless
it felt at the time that the court would have had jurisdiction even if the facts
outside the complaint were taken into account.
2s The only factual difference that might have been made between the two
cases is that in the Douglas Aircraft case the plaintiff had contracts with the
United States and the complaint so alleged. This fact alone, however, would not
seem to be sufficient to determine that the Douglas Aircraft Company was subject
to the jurisdiction of the NLRB from the face of the complaint.
" The only procedural difference between the Douglas Aircraft case and the
Jones Construction case that appears from the reports is that in the former the
trial court made the findings of fact before the order was made, and in the latter
the court made the appropriate finding of fact on motion of the defendant after
the order was made. In neither case were the jurisdictional facts disputed.
30 247 N.C. at 628, 101 S.E.2d at 806.
31 Ibid.
39247 N.C. at 628-29, 101 S.E.2d at 807. The Supreme Court of Kansas, deciding a similar case atising after Farnsworth, expresses an attitude similar to
that of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Douglas Aircraft case. In
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Local 795, Teamsters Union, AFL, 317 P.Zd 349 (Kansas
1957), the plaintiff argued that § 14(b) of the NLRA granted the states power
to prohibit compulsory union agreements and that "as a necessary incident to the
full exercise of that power, states may enjoin conduct directed toward the illegal
execution . . . of such agreements in violation of state law." Id. at 359. The
Kansas Supreme Court said, "It would appear there is substantial merit in plaintiff's
assertion were it not for the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in ... International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A.F. of L. v. Farnsworth
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In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.3 3 the United
States Supreme Court said, "To the extent that Congress prescribed
preventive procedure against unfair labor practices, that case [Garner]
recognized the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same
end."' 34 The Farnsworth case does not enlarge the Garner case but
rather clarifies it by implication. If a union is picketing an employer
to induce him to coerce his employees into joining the union, or to compel him to recognize the union when it does not in fact represent a
majority of his employees, or some other purpose unlawful under the
NLRA, the state court may not assume jurisdiction because it finds
the additional unlawful purpose of violating a state law outlawing or
restricting union-security agreements.
The NLRA only permits union-security agreements 3 5 where a labor
organization is the representative designated for collective bargaining
purposes by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit 6 and
where the affidavits and reports required by the act 37 have been filed.
The NLRA further provides that such union-security agreements, even
when valid under federal law, are not valid where they are prohibited
by state law. 38 Thus, conduct subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB
which also frequently has a purpose in violation of a state "Right-toWork" law would be:
(1) Picketing to coerce employees to join a union, which is a violation of section 8(b) (1) as an attempt "to restrain or coerce . . . em-

ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157 .
and Chambers Co...
"The opinions above referred to . . .require us to hold that a district court
lacks jurisdiction to enjoin conduct of a labor union directed toward the ultimate
purpose of compelling an employer engaged in interstate commerce to enter into
an all union agreement ...." Id. at 359-60. One justice in a concurring opinion,
questioning the soundness of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
legislative intent, said, "It is an unwarranted conclusion, denying the effect of
§ 14(b), which permits the states to regulate or prohibit on the one hand, and
denies enforcement of such regulations or prohibitions on the other ....
"....In this area the state acts under the auspices of federal power, and
not, as in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch . . . and in Garner . . . by attempting to pit

state jurisdictionagainst federal pre-empted jurisdiction." Id. at 363-64.

3Id. at 665.
's347 U.S. 656 (1954).
"National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
9(a), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
"Id.,
'1Id., § 9(g), (h), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(g), (h)
(1952).
"Id., § 14(b), 61 STAT. 151 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
"Id., § 8(b)(1), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)
(1952). In Teamsters Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 33 (1957), the Board said there
was nothing in the language of § 8(b) (1) (A) that limited the words "coerce or
restrain" to direct application of pressure by a union on employees. The diminution
of the employee's financial security is not less damaging because it is achieved
indirectly by a preceding curtailment of the employer's business. See also Stacey v.
Pappas, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
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(2) Picketing to compel the employer (a) to coerce his employees
into union membership, or (b) to sign a union-security agreement with
a union that does not qualify as authorized to enter into such an agreement under section 8(a) (3). This is a violation of section 8(b) (2) in
that it is an attempt "to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection
[8] (a)(3) ... ._,,40
(3) Picketing one employer to induce his employees to refuse to
handle goods or perform services where the purpose is to compel a second
employer to recognize a union that does not represent his employees, a
violation of section 8(b) (4) (B) .41
After eliminating all the picketing that would amount to an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA, a meager area, if any, is left to state
jurisdiction. Assume a case where the picketing is for the purpose of
compelling an employer to sign a union-security agreement and the
union is the designated representative of a majority of the employees
and has otherwise complied with the NLRA. 42 If the state where the
picketing takes place has legislation prohibiting union-security agreements or permitting them only under certain conditions or within certain
limits, it is conceivable that under the Farnsworth case the picketing
might validly be enjoined by the state court since there is no specific
provision in section 8 of the NLRA making such conduct an unfair labor
practice. As the United States Supreme Court said in Local 232,
43
Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
forbidden by federal statute nor
there may be conduct that is "neither
44
legalized and approved thereby."
The state is not powerless to effectuate legislation invalidating unionsecurity agreements. As the court said in the Douglas Aircraft case,
"National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (2), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952). Picketing to compel an unlawful union-security
contract is a violation of § 8(b) (2). Medford Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council,
96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951). In Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., 119
N.L.R.B. 133 (1957), a union coerced a contractor into removing from a project
a subcontractor whose employees were members of a different union. The Board
said the prime contractor's succumbing to the union demands constituted a violation
of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) even though no employer-employee relationship existed
between the prime contractor and the employees of a subcontractor.
"'National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (B), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1952). This section makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to induce conduct by the employees of any
employer "where an object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any other employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of Section 159 . . . ." In the Douglas Aircraft
case the North Carolina Supreme Court apparently determined that § 8(b) (4) (B)
had been violated rather than § 8(b) (2).
See notes 35-37 supra.
('336 U.S. 245 (1949).
"Id. at 265.
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"Restraining orders are not the only remedies available to control
obedience to a valid statute. Criminal process and tort actions for
damages are also ... used for this purpose." 45 As the Laburnum case
points out, a state is not prohibited from providing a remedy for unlawful conduct. It is only when the state remedy duplicates the federal
remedy for the same conduct that the state remedy must give way. In
North Carolina, under the "Right-to-Work" law, a union-security agreement is void and unenforceable. 46 A violation of the law is punishable
as a misdemeanor. 47 A person denied employment in violation of the
law has a cause of action for damages sustained by the denial of em48

ployment.

The problem of federal-state relations in labor disputes threatens
to be a continuing one. This Note has dealt with only one aspect of the
problem. State court injunctions against picketing have posed a dilemma
for the enjoined party who feels that the state court has acted erroneously and that a more favorable result would be available if the NLRB
had assumed jurisdiction. However, even if the enjoined party has a
valid argument that his conduct should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, there is no practical way at present to have the question
determined except by appealing through the state courts to the United
States Supreme Court.49 Often the issues are moot by the time of
final adjudication and even if decided in favor of the enjoined party
he will have nothing but a paper right, the purpose of the injunction
having been long since accomplished. On the other hand, if the
conduct is wrongful, as alleged, irreparable damage may be done to an
employer's business unless prompt relief is available. Picketing resulting
in a secondary boycott can sometimes drive a small employer out of
business while he is waiting for the NLRB to determine his rights, and
the state courts have often provided the only source of prompt relief.50
247 N.C. at 629, 101 S.E.2d at 807.
'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-79 (1950), In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C.
395, T57 S.E.2d 366 (1950).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-78 (1950), State v. Bishop, 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E.2d
858 8(1947).
N.C. GEN. STAT. J 95-83 (1950).
"In Capitol Service v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), the Court held that the
NLRB could request a federal court to enjoin a state injunction where the NLRB
deemed it necessary to protect its jurisdiction.

But in Amalgamated Clothing

Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court held that while
the NLRB is authorized to apply to a district court for injunctive relief in certain

circumstances, this does not authorize private litigants to apply for such relief.

Since the NLRB will not assume jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice until
a complaint has been filed, a labor organization whose conduct has been enjoined
by a state court has no procedural method of getting the NLRB to exercise its
jurisdiction.

" Since the decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957),

and companion cases, many a small business is left not only without an efficient

remedy against wrongful conduct by a labor union but without any remedy at all.
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Continued litigation in the courts apparently will prove a fruitless
method of solving the problem areas of the federal-state jurisdictional
question. The United States Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd. 51 has indicated it will not step in to fill the no-man's land
left in the NLRA by the Congress. The ultimate solution will be for
Congress to express its intent as to the proper bounds of the NLRB's
jurisdiction.
J. HALBERT CONOLY
Liens-Mechanic's Liens-Acquisition and Priorities-Effect of
Regaining Possession
Since Johnson v. Yates' it has been the rule in North Carolina that
a mortgagor in possession with the consent of the mortgagee may subject
a mortgaged automobile to a mechanic's lien which will take priority
over the chattel mortgagee's interest. In that case it was decided that
the statutory term, "owner or legal possessor,"'2 included such a mortgagor, in whom the law implied authority from the mortgagee to contract for necessary and reasonable repairs.
In Barbre-Askew Finance, Inc. v. Thompson,8 the chattel mortgagor
of an automobile left it with a mechanic under a contract for repairs at
a stated price. After the major portion of the work was completed, the
mechanic relinquished possession to the mortgagor with the understanding that the automobile was to be returned for completion of repairs.
The automobile was subsequently returned and the repairs completed.
While it was in the shop for these latter repairs the mortgagor defaulted
In the Guss case the Court held that if a dispute affected interstate commerce so
as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the states were precluded from
acting even where the NLRB had announced in advance that it would decline
jurisdiction unless certain specified amounts of interstate commerce were involved.
See note 26 supra.
rx 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957). "We are told . . . that to deny the State jurisdiction here will create a vast no-man's-land, subject to regulation by no agency
or court. We are told . . . that to grant jurisdiction would produce confusion and
conflicts with federal policy .... [B]oth may be right. We believe, however, that
Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity. Since Congress' power
in the area of commerce among the states is plenary, its judgment must be respected
whatever policy objections there may be to creation of a non-man's-land. Congress
is free to change the situation at will." See Henderson, The "No Man's" Land
Betweeit State and Federal Jurisdiction, 8 LAB. L.J. 587 (1957).
1183 N.C.24, 110 S.E. 603 (1922).
I N.C. GEx. STAT. § 44-2 (1949). "Any mechanic or artisan who makes,
alters or repairs any article of personal property at the request of the owner or
legal possessor of such property has a lien on such property so made, altered or
repaired for his just and reasonable charge for his work done and material
furnished, and may hold and retain possession of the same until such just and
reasonable charges are paid ... " This statute further provides for enforcement
by sale.
247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E2d 381 (1957).

